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Recently, de Boysson, Belleville, Phillips et al. (2011) found that patients with Lewy-body disease (LBD) showed signiﬁcantly lower rates of false
memories than healthy controls, using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) experimental procedure. Given that this result could be explained by the
practically null rate of true recognition in the LBD group (0.09), we decided to replicate the study by de Boysson et al. (2011), but including a new
condition that would maximize the true recognition rate (and analyze its effect on the rate of false memories). Speciﬁcally, in a DRM experiment, we
manipulated (within subjects) two study and recognition conditions: in the “immediate” condition, both the LBD patients and the control group of healthy
older people received a different recognition test after each study list (containing twelve words associated with a non-presented critical word), while in the
“delayed” condition (similar to the one in de Boysson et al., 2011), the participants received the entire series of study lists and then took only one
recognition test. The results showed that, in both samples, the “immediate” condition produced higher corrected rates of both true and false recognition
than the “delayed” condition, although they were both lower in the LBD patients, which shows that these patients are capable of encoding and recognizing
the general similitude underlying information (gist memory) in the right conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
Memory is a reconstructive process that sometimes makes errors.
False memories are some of the most widely studied errors,
especially using the experimental procedure by Deese–Roediger–
McDermott (DRM; Roediger and McDermott, 1995). With this
procedure, subjects study lists of words (e.g., wind, fresh, oxygen,
etc.) that are associated with a non-studied critical lure (e.g., air),
and they are more likely to falsely recall or recognize these
critical lures (e.g., air) than unrelated lures (e.g., sleep). This
procedure has been used to show that false memories increase
with age in healthy people (e.g., Balota, Cortese, Duchek et al.,
1999; Dennis, Kim & Cabeza, 2007; Norman & Schacter, 1997).
By contrast, several studies have shown that false recognition is
signiﬁcantly lower in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD; a
disease that accounts for most cases of degenerative dementia)
than in healthy older adults, but only after controlling for false
alarms to unrelated lures (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Budson,
Sitarski, Daffner & Schacter, 2002; Hudon, Belleville, Souchay,
Gely-Nargeot, Chertkow & Gauthier, 2006). However, if we do
not control the basal level of false alarms, AD patients show false
recognition rates of critical lures that are similar to or greater than
those found in healthy people of the same age (e.g., Balota et al.,
1999; Plancher, Guyard, Nicolas & Piolino, 2006; Watson, Balota
& Sergent-Marsall, 2001). The reason it is important to correct for
baseline false alarms in patients with dementia is that these
patients tend to show a more liberal response bias than that of
healthy older adults (e.g., Budson, Wolk, Chong & Waring, 2006;
Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988), which increases their rates of hits
and false alarms, thus reducing their corrected rates of both true
and false recognition compared to healthy adults. These results
have been interpreted (e.g., Balota et al., 1999; Budson, Todman
& Schacter, 2006; Gallo, Shahid, Olson, Solomon, Schacter &
Budson, 2006) as indicating that these AD patients seem to have
a limited capacity to acquire, retain or recover the general
similitude underlying the information (or gist memory; Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995), a capacity that is preserved in healthy adults. For
other authors (e.g., Gallo, Sullivan, Daffner, Schacter & Budson,
2004), the more liberal response bias of dementia patients is due
to the fact that they tend to automatically base their responses on
familiarity to make up for their episodic memory deﬁcits (e.g.,
on item-speciﬁc recollection, the recollection-based monitoring
process or the recall-to-reject process; e.g., Gallo et al., 2004),
increasing their rates of both hits and false alarms.
However, the role of false memories in other forms of dementia
has received much less attention in the literature. Only the study
by de Boysson et al. (2011) analyzed the role of false recognition
in Lewy-body dementia (LBD), the second most common type of
degenerative dementia in older people, accounting for 10–15%
of dementia cases (see McKeith, Mintzer, Aarsland et al., 2004;
McKeith, Dickson, Lowe, et al. 2005). De Boysson et al. (2011)
applied the DRM procedure to a sample of 10 LBD patients, 15
patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), and 30 balanced
controls. They found that both groups of patients showed a
reduced level of false recognition of the critical targets, but
this reduction was greater in patients with LBD than in patients
with FTD.
Nonetheless, the results from de Boysson et al. (2011) raise
some questions: for example, if we observe the data, we realize
that the LBD patients hardly show real learning of the lists (true
recognition = hit rate  unrelated false alarm rate = 0.09). If
there is no learning, it is difﬁcult to talk about false recognition,
given that it is based on learning the associative relationships
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among the words on the study lists. Instead, their data seem to
indicate a mere liberal response bias in the two groups of patients
(which can be noted in their high rates of hits and false alarms).
The low rate of learning in the LBD patients could be due to the
fact that the study task proposed by de Boysson et al. (2011)
might be too long for patients with dementia (as they had to study
12 study lists in a row with 12 words in each, that is, memorize
144 stimuli), which could lead to a ﬂoor effect in their rates of
true recognition. Therefore, the ﬁrst objective of the present study
is to give the LBD patients a study task that maximizes the
learning of the lists. Speciﬁcally, a different recognition test will
be made for each study list containing 12 words associated with a
non-presented critical lure. This condition will be called
“immediate”, compared to the one proposed by de Boysson et al.
(2011), which we will call “delayed”, where only a recognition
test was applied after all study lists had been studied. With this
immediate condition, we want to achieve higher true recognition
rates in LBD patients than those obtained by Boysson et al.
(2011) in their delayed condition, which will probably modify the
false recognition rates.
Second, de Boysson et al. (2011) controlled the overall level of
false alarms on the false recognition of the critical targets by
means of an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) (using the
unrelated false alarms as covariate), and not by subtracting the
rate of unrelated false alarms from the rate of false recognition of
the critical targets, which is the usual procedure (see e.g., Budson,
Sitarski, Daffner & Schacter, 2002; Budson, Sullivan, Mayer
et al., 2002; Budson, Todman & Schacter, 2006; Hudon et al.,
2006). The use of the ANCOVA to estimate the false recognition
of the critical targets could pose a methodological problem, as the
ANCOVA requires the random assignment of the subjects to the
treatments in order to justify the attribution of causality (e.g.,
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). This statistical analysis could in
itself be the reason for the results mentioned above, as it is quite
unexpected to achieve, from a very low rate of true recognition in
the LBD group (0.09), a false memory rate that is lower than the
control group, but moderately high (0.41).
Based on all of these problems, we intend to apply the DRM
procedure to a sample of LBD patients (and their respective
controls) in order to, ﬁrst, increase the level of true recognition,
and then later ﬁnd out whether the LBD patients actually show
the capacity to elicit false memories (correctly corrected), or
whether they merely show a liberal response bias. In order to
maximize the possibilities of the LBD patients really learn the
study lists (thus increasing the possibilities that they will later
elicit false memories), we will manipulate two within-subject
study and recognition conditions. On one hand, in the delayed
condition (see Fig. 1), we will use a similar procedure as in de
Fig. 1. Explanatory diagram of the two experimental conditions (see text for details).
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Boysson et al. (2011), that is, sequentially presenting to each
participant 11 study lists (each made up of 12 words associated
with a non-studied critical lure), followed by a later recognition
test containing 66 items. Half of the items will have been studied
before on one of the study lists, and the other half will consist of
one-third critical lures, one-third weakly-related lures (i.e., the
13th associate of each critical lure), and one-third unrelated lures.
On the other hand, in the immediate condition (see Fig. 1) the
participants will study each study list separately (each made up of
12 words associated with a non-studied critical lure). After each
list, a recognition test will be performed (thus taking 11
recognition tests for the 11 lists studied). On each test,
participants will have to recognize six items, three old and three
new (of which, one will be the critical lure for each list, another a
weakly-related lure, and the third an unrelated lure). Our objective
with this immediate condition is to maximize the probability of
increasing true recognition and eliciting false memories because it
is well known that this type of presentation leads to greater levels
of false recognition in healthy adults than presenting all the study
lists together (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna & Forrest, 2002; Toglia,
Neuschatz & Goodwin, 1999; Tussing & Greene, 1997).
We hypothesize that if the LBD patients show an incapacity to
learn the general similitude underlying the information (gist
memory), both their true recognition and false recognition rates
should be the same in the immediate and delayed conditions,
while if they maintain this capacity to a certain extent, then both
their true recognition and false recognition rates will be greater in
the immediate condition than in the delayed condition. Moreover,
following this argument, the controls should also show higher
rates of true and false recognition in the immediate condition than
in the delayed condition. Logically, both rates should be higher
than those found in the LBD sample, given that, among other
reasons, patients with dementia show a greater associative-binding
deﬁcit than healthy controls (see e.g., Old & Naveh-Benjamin,
2008), or they make worse use of the recollection-based
monitoring process (see e.g., Gallo et al., 2004) to reduce their
rates of false alarms.
METHOD
Participants
Eleven patients with a clinical diagnosis of probable Lewy-Body Disease
(LBD) and 15 healthy adults serving as controls participated in the
experiment. The LBD patients were recruited from the Neurology
Department of the General Hospital in Valencia, Spain. Diagnosis was
carried out after studying the medical history of each patient and
performing a physical, neurological, neuropsychological, and psychiatric
examination. Diagnosis was based on consensus criteria (McKeith et al.,
2004, 2005), identifying a progressive disabling mental impairment
leading to dementia attentional impairments and disproportionate problem
solving and visuospatial difﬁculties, ﬂuctuation in cognitive function,
persistent well-formed visual hallucinations, and spontaneous motor
features of Parkinsonism. Exclusion criteria for the LBD group were
signiﬁcant past episodes of psychiatric or neuropsychological disorder,
presence of other causes of dementia or brain illnesses (vascular injury,
surgical brain procedure, craneoencephalic trauma), a history of alcohol or
drug abuse, or a very serious attention deﬁcit that would make it
impossible to perform the experimental test. The control group was
comprised of healthy volunteers from centers specializing in elderly care
residing in Valencia who showed no signs of depression, alcoholism, drug
intake, dementia, or any other neurological disorder.
Regarding the demographic data, both groups were matched on age
(mean of the LBD sample = 81.09 years, range 70–91 years; mean of the
control sample = 78.07 years, range 75–85 years; t12.68 = 1.53, p = 0.15),
gender (3 men, 8 women in the LBD sample; 2 men, 13 women in the
control group; v1
2 = 0.79, p = 0.37) and years of education (mean of the
LBD sample = 6.27 years, range 0–11 years; mean of the control
sample = 5.67 years, range 0–11 years; t24 = 0.33, p = 0.75). Further-
more, all participants underwent extensive psychometric evaluation (see
neuropsychological data in Table 1). The neuropsychological battery
consisted of: the Global Deterioration Scale (GDS; Reisberg, Ferris & De
Leon, 1982); Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein
& McHugh, 1975); Geriatric Depression Scale (Sheikh & Yesavage,
1986); Functional evaluation: the Barthel index (Mahoney & Barthel,
1965); Cummings Neuropsychiatric Inventory (Cummings, Mega, Gray,
Rosenberg-Thompson, Carusi & Gornbein, 1994); Verbal Fluency-
Semantic, Verbal Fluency-Phonological and verbal abstraction (Pe~na-
Casanova, 2005); Boston Naming Test (Kaplan, Goodglass & Weintraub,
1983); Logical Memory subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale III
(Wechsler, 2004); Trail Making Test-A (Reitan, 1958); Rey–Osterrieth
Complex Figure (Rey, 1999); and the Stroop Test (Golden, 2005).
Table 1. Means (and SE) of the neuropsychological data
LBD
(n = 11)
Healthy
controls
(n = 15)
Signiﬁcant
differences*
(p < 0.05)
Global Deterioration Scale 3.36 (0.20) 1.00 (0.00) *
Mini-Mental State Examination 19.00 (1.53) 27.47 (0.51) *
Geriatric Depression Scale 5.45 (1.14) 2.50 (0.44) *
Barthel Index 74.09 (5.98) 98.33 (0.79) *
Cummings Neuropsychiatric Inventory 27.82 (6.47) 0.00 (0.00) *
Verbal ﬂuency Phonemic 6.82 (0.97) 16.73 (1.81) *
Verbal ﬂuency Semantic 11.73 (2.16) 16.80 (1.98)
Verbal abstraction 3.09 (0.69) 5.20 (0.35) *
Boston Naming Test 6.64 (0.75) 9.00 (0.46) *
Logical-Memory Immediate Units 3.73 (0.91) 19.73 (2.20) *
Logical-Memory Immediate Themes 5.18 (0.92) 12.40 (0.73) *
Trail Making Test-A (seconds) 105.36 (29.44) 86.13 (6.85)
Visual Memory Test—Immediate 8.09 (3.55) 25.73 (2.53) *
Visual Memory Test—Delayed 1.09 (0.71) 8.70 (2.01) *
Stroop Interference (T standard scores) 50.18 (1.79) 59.33 (3.02) *
Notes: Data represent raw scores except those speciﬁed in brackets.
*Indicates worse performance in the LBD sample.
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Statistical analyses showed that the LBD group was cognitively
impaired compared to healthy controls (see Table 1). However, the Verbal
ﬂuency semantic (animals) test and the Trail Making Test-A showed no
signiﬁcant differences between the two groups.
Materials and procedure
Forty-four study lists of 15 semantically-related words were created.
Materials were selected from the lists of semantic associates published by
Fernandez, Dıez and Alonso (2012). Each study list was composed of 12
words that were associatively related to a non-presented critical word, as is
common in DRM experiments. Each list of words was presented in
decreasing order of associative strength, starting with the word most
closely associated with the target. On each list we reserved the last three
words for use as weakly-related lures in the recognition phase. The 44 lists
were divided into four blocks of 11 lists each, and the blocks were
balanced on mean frequency (Block 1: frequency of 55%; Block 2:
frequency of 56%; Block 3: frequency of 55%; Block 4: frequency of
55%). We manipulated two conditions with two blocks in each. In the
delayed presentation condition (see Fig. 1), participants were instructed to
listen carefully to the 11 word lists containing 12 words each (each list
separated by a period of 5 seconds), and they were told that their memory
would subsequently be tested. Words were read at a rate of about 1 s per
word. The presentation of the 11 lists was followed by a recognition phase
containing 66 items (half studied and half not studied; see below). Next,
after a rest period of 10 minutes, participants studied a second block of 11
lists (containing 12 words each) and then performed a second recognition
test with another 66 items. In the immediate presentation condition (see
Fig. 1), participants were told to listen carefully to each list of 12 words,
and that their memory would be tested after each list. After each study list,
the participants performed a recognition test containing 6 items (half of
them studied and half not studied; see below), repeating this process 11
times. Then, after a 10-minute rest period, they received a second block of
11 study lists (each containing 12 words), each followed by its
corresponding 6-word recognition test. Blocks were counterbalanced
across participants and across study and test conditions.
On each of the two recognition tests in the delayed condition, there
were 33 studied items and 33 non-studied items (or lures). The 33 studied
items consisted of three words from each of the 11 lists presented.
Because the words on each list were classiﬁed according to their degree of
semantic link to the critical target, we chose words in the same position on
each list, drawn from input positions 3, 9, and 11. The 33 non-studied
words were of three types: 11 critical lures, 11 weakly-related lures (the
13th associate of each list), and 11 unrelated lures (words that were not
related semantically to any of the critical targets). On each of the 22
recognition tests in the immediate condition, there were three studied items
(words selected from positions 3, 9 and 11 of each list) and three non-
studied lures (the critical lure, the weakly-related lure or 13th associate of
each list, and one unrelated lure). On all the recognition tests, participants
were instructed to decide whether the words they were hearing consisted
of studied or non-studied items from the former study list (old/new
judgment). There was no time limit for responding in the recognition
phase.
The patients and healthy elderly controls individually completed the
neuropsychological evaluation and the two experimental conditions in two
sessions (one day the delayed presentation condition and one week later
the immediate presentation condition, counterbalanced across participants).
The stimuli were presented in the center of a computer screen, in black
lowercase Courier New Bold 18-point letters, on a white background and
read aloud by the examiner. Responses were given verbally and noted by
the examiner.
RESULTS
The data from the DRM tasks were analyzed by means of mixed
analyses of variance with 2 groups (LBD vs controls, between
subjects) 9 2 presentation conditions (delayed vs immediate,
within subjects). True recognition performance was evaluated by
subtracting the proportion of false alarms to unrelated lures from
the proportion of hits to studied words. False recognition was
evaluated by referring to the proportion of false alarms to critical
lures to the baseline of false alarms to unrelated lures. We also
calculated the sensitivity (A0) and response bias (BD0 0) for true
and false recognition (see e.g., Hudon et al., 2006). As Snodgrass
and Corwin (1988) point out, A0 is more sensitive than d0 in
memory-impaired populations. The A0 score ranges between 0
and 1, with 0.5 representing performance at the chance level, and
higher scores indicating greater sensitivity and accuracy. The BD0 0
score ranges between 1 and 1, and a 0 score indicates a neutral
response criterion, negative values indicate liberal or lenient
responding, and positive values reﬂect a conservative bias.
Regarding true recognition, a 2 9 2 analysis of variance on hits
minus unrelated false alarms (H – FAU; see Table 2) showed that
the main effects of both the presentation conditions (F1,24 = 55.39,
p = 0.0001, eta2p = 0.70) and groups (F1,24 = 23.92, p = 0.0001,
eta2p = 0.50) were signiﬁcant, indicating better true recognition
in the control group (mean = 0.45) than in the LBD group
(mean = 0.19), and in the immediate condition (mean = 0.43)
than in the delayed condition (mean = 0.21). The interaction
between the two variables was not signiﬁcant (F1,24 < 1).
Comparing the true recognition means in the LBD group to the
value of 0 (which would indicate a complete absence of learning),
we observed that in the immediate condition, this mean (0.30; see
Table 2) differed signiﬁcantly from the value of 0 (t10 = 5.34,
p = 0.0001), while the difference between the mean of the LBD
group in the delayed condition (0.08; a ﬁgure that coincides
exactly with what was obtained by de Boisson et al., 2011) and
Table 2. Mean proportions (and SE) of hits, false alarms on unrelated
lures, false alarms on critical lures and false alarms on related lures for
immediate and delayed conditions and control and LBD groups, and their
estimations of true and false recognition with their Sensitivity (A0) and
Response Bias (B″D) indices.
Control group LBD group
Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed
Hits (H) 0.66 (0.04) 0.61 (0.06) 0.67 (0.05) 0.58 (0.07)
False alarms on
unrelated lures
(FAU)
0.09 (0.04) 0.27 (0.05) 0.37 (0.05) 0.50 (0.06)
False alarms on
critical lures
(FAC)
0.56 (0.06) 0.63 (0.06) 0.67 (0.07) 0.63 (0.07)
False alarms on
related lures
(FAR)
0.21 (0.05) 0.38 (0.06) 0.45 (0.06) 0.44 (0.07)
True recognition
(H – FAU)
0.56 (0.04) 0.34 (0.04) 0.30 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05)
A0 0.88 (0.02) 0.76 (0.02) 0.73 (0.02) 0.63 (0.03)
Β0 0D 0.59 (0.10) 0.12 (0.07) 0.03 (0.12) 0.07 (0.09)
False recognition
(FAC – FAU)
0.46 (0.05) 0.37 (0.04) 0.30 (0.06) 0.13 (0.05)
A0 0.85 (0.02) 0.77 (0.03) 0.73 (0.03) 0.67 (0.03)
Β″D 0.56 (0.12) 0.11 (0.08) 0.08 (0.14) 0.09 (0.09)
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the value of 0 was marginally signiﬁcant (t10 = 2.04, p = 0.069),
indicating a level of true recognition that is only slightly different
from chance in this group.
A similar 2 9 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) of
the true recognition sensitivity index (A0, Table 2) showed a
similar pattern of results as in the former analysis. That is, it
showed signiﬁcant main effects of both the presentation con-
ditions (F1,24 = 40.11, p = 0.0001, eta
2
p = 0.63) and groups
(F1,24 = 21.26, p = 0.0001, eta
2
p = 0.47), indicating better
recognition in the control group (mean = 0.82) than in the
LBD group (mean = 0.68), and in the immediate condition
(mean = 0.80) than in the delayed condition (mean = 0.69). The
interaction between the two variables was not signiﬁcant
(F1,24 < 1).
The analysis of uncorrected hits (H; see Table 2) showed a
non-signiﬁcant main effect of group (F1,24 < 1; as e.g., Hudon
et al., 2009), whereas the main effect of presentation
conditions was marginally signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 3.84, p = 0.062,
eta2p = 0.14), indicating a tendency to have more hits in the
immediate condition (mean = 0.66) than in the delayed condition
(mean = 0.59). The interaction between the two variables was not
signiﬁcant (F1,24 < 1).
Regarding the analysis of unrelated false alarms (FAU; see
Table 2), the main effects of both the groups and presenta-
tion conditions were signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 16.03, p = 0.001,
eta2p = 0.40 and F1,24 = 18.07, p = 0.0001, eta
2
p = 0.43,
respectively), indicating that the LBD group committed more
unrelated false alarms (mean = 0.43) than the control group
(mean = 0.18), and that more unrelated false alarms were made in
the delayed condition (mean = 0.38) than in the immediate
condition (mean = 0.23). The interaction between the two
variables was not signiﬁcant (F1,24 < 1).
Overall, the results for true recognition show that the
differences in learning between the control and LBD groups are
not found in their hit rates (which are similar), but rather in the
fact that the LBD group makes signiﬁcantly more unrelated false
alarms than the control group, probably because of worse use of
processes like recall-to-reject or recollection of item-speciﬁc
information to reduce false alarm rates (see e.g., Abe, Fujii,
Nishio et al., 2011; Gallo et al., 2004). Another explanation
could be that the LBD group has a more liberal response bias
than the control group.
Therefore, we analyzed whether the LBD group shows a more
liberal response bias than the control group (which would
artiﬁcially increase the rates of both hits and false alarms) by
means of a 2 9 2 mixed ANOVA on the true recognition bias
(B0 0D, Table 2), which showed signiﬁcant main effects of both the
presentation conditions (F1,24 = 14.85, p = 0.001, eta
2
p = 0.38)
and the groups (F1,24 = 10.22, p = 0.004, eta
2
p = 0.30),
indicating a more conservative response bias in the control group
(mean = 0.36) than in the LBD group (mean = 0.02), and in
the immediate condition (mean = 0.31) than in the delayed
condition (mean = 0.03). The interaction between the two
variables was also signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 5.92, p < 0.05,
eta2p = 0.20). Post hoc Bonferroni tests to analyze this interaction
(Table 2) showed a non-signiﬁcant difference between the
immediate and delayed conditions in the LBD patients (means
0.03 and 0.07, respectively; t10 = 1.12), which indicates that
these patients are equally neutral in their responses in both
conditions, whereas this difference was signiﬁcant in the control
group (means of 0.59 and 0.12, for the immediate and delayed
conditions, respectively; t14 = 4.39, p = 0.001), indicating that
the controls are much more conservative in the immediate
condition than in the delayed one. Thus, the results of this
signiﬁcant interaction show that the LBD patients have a neutral
response bias, which conﬁrms that the results we found for true
recognition cannot be explained by a mere liberal bias in their
responses.
Regarding corrected false recognition of the critical lures (FAC
– FAU; Table 2), a 2 9 2 analysis of variance showed a
signiﬁcant main effect of both the presentation conditions
(F1,24 = 12.87, p = 0.001, eta
2
p = 0.35) and the groups
(F1,24 = 9.94, p = 0.004, eta
2
p = 0.29), indicating that the control
group committed more false recognitions of critical lures
(mean = 0.42) than the LBD group (mean = 0.21), and that the
immediate condition led to more false recognitions of critical
lures (mean = 0.38) than the delayed condition (mean = 0.25), as
expected. The interaction between the two variables was not
signiﬁcant (F1,24 < 1). Comparing the false recognition means of
the LBD group with the value of 0 (which would indicate a
complete absence of false memories), we observed that in the
delayed condition, this mean (0.13; see Table 2) differed
signiﬁcantly from the value of 0 (t10 = 2.67, p < 0.05), as did the
mean of the immediate condition (0.30; t10 = 4.48, p = 0.001),
which indicates that the LBD group is capable of eliciting false
memories in both conditions. However, it should be pointed out
that the mean of false recognitions of critical lures in the LBD
group in the delayed condition (0.13) is signiﬁcantly lower than
what was observed by de Boysson et al. (2011, which was 0.41),
which seems to suggest that ANCOVA may overestimate false
recognition.
A similar 2 9 2 mixed ANOVA on the false recognition
sensitivity index (A0, Table 2) showed a similar pattern of results
to the one found for false recognition; that is, it showed
signiﬁcant main effects of both the presentation conditions
(F1,24 = 13.01, p = 0.001, eta
2
p = 0.35) and the groups
(F1,24 = 11.52, p = 0.002, eta
2
p = 0.32), indicating better false
recognition discrimination in the control group (mean = 0.81)
than in the LBD group (mean = 0.70), and in the immediate
condition (mean = 0.79) than in the delayed condition
(mean = 0.72). The interaction between the two variables was not
signiﬁcant (F1,24 < 1).
Regarding the analysis of the false recognition bias (B0 0D,
Table 2), the 2 9 2 mixed ANOVA showed signiﬁcant main
effects of both the presentation conditions (F1,24 = 6.32, p < 0.05,
eta2p = 0.21) and groups (F1,24 = 11.26, p = 0.003, eta
2
p = 0.32),
indicating a more conservative bias in the control group
(mean = 0.34) than in the LBD group (mean = 0.08), and in the
immediate condition (mean = 0.24) than in the delayed condition
(mean = 0.01). The interaction between the two variables was also
signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 5.66, p < 0.05, eta
2
p = 0.19). Post hoc
Bonferroni tests to analyze this interaction (Table 2) showed a
non-signiﬁcant difference between the immediate and delayed
conditions in the LBD patients (means 0.08 and 0.09,
respectively; t10 < 1), which clearly indicates that the LBD group
uses a neutral response criterion, whereas this difference was
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signiﬁcant in the control group (means of 0.56 and 0.11, for the
immediate and delayed conditions, respectively; t14 = 3.85,
p = 0.002), exactly replicating the results found for true
recognition bias.
Finally, regarding the analysis of false recognitions of corrected
weakly-related lures (FAR – FAU; see Table 2), the main effect
of the variable group was signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 5.95, p < 0.05,
eta2p = 0.20), indicating that the control group committed more
false recognitions on related lures (mean = 0.12) than the LBD
group (mean = 0.01). The main effect of the presentation
conditions was marginally signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 3.78, p = 0.064,
eta2p = 0.14), indicating a tendency to commit more false
recognitions on related lures in the immediate condition
(mean = 0.10) than in the delayed condition (mean = 0.03). The
interaction between the two variables was also marginally
signiﬁcant (F1,24 = 3.99, p = 0.057, eta
2
p = 0.14), probably due
to a ﬂoor effect in the LBD group in the delayed condition
(mean = 0.06). All the means for false alarms on related lures
were located between the means for false alarms on critical lures
and the means for false alarms on unrelated lures (see Table 2),
supporting our experimental procedure (see Roediger &
McDermott, 1995).
DISCUSSION
Our results, in agreement with the hypotheses proposed, show
that by maximizing the learning of the lists by employing
an immediate condition, we were able to increase the false
recognition of critical lures in LBD patients (as well as in healthy
ones). In other words, this LBD group is capable of eliciting false
memories in the immediate condition and, to a lesser degree, in
the delayed condition, revealing that LBD patients show a certain
capacity to learn the general similitude underlying the informa-
tion (gist memory). However, this capacity is lower than that
of a control group of healthy older people, which places the per-
formance of the LBD group on DRM tasks at a level comparable
to the performance of AD patients (Balota et al., 1999; Budson
et al., 2002; Hudon et al., 2006). These results also coincide with
those observed when comparing LBD and AD patients on cogni-
tive or neuropsychiatric measures (e.g., Walker, McKeith, Rodda
et al., 2012). However, even though the rate of true recognition in
our data in the delayed condition is exactly the same as what de
Boysson et al. (2011) obtained, our rate of false recognition of
critical lures in this condition is signiﬁcantly lower than what was
obtained by these authors, which seems to indicate that controlling
the basal rate of false alarms to unrelated lures using ANCOVA
does not appear to be a correct statistical procedure for estimating
the false recognition of critical lures.
Our results also demonstrate that the corrected rate of false
recognition tends to be proportional to the corrected rate of true
recognition (see Table 2; results similar to those obtained e.g., by
Hudon et al., 2006), in both LBD patients and controls, and in
both the delayed and immediate conditions, showing that false
recognition is based on learning the associative relationships
between the words on the study lists and that this learning must
be situated at intermediate levels to optimally elicit false
memories (if the true recognition reaches a ceiling or ﬂoor effect,
there cannot be any elicitation of false memories). Only in the
immediate condition in the control group did true recognition
signiﬁcantly surpass false recognition (means of 0.56 and 0.46,
respectively; t14 = 2.45, p < 0.05; see Table 2), which would
indicate that healthy older people are using another mechanism, in
addition to gist memory, to respond. This idea becomes
reinforced if we consider that the control group uses a much more
conservative response bias in the immediate condition than in the
delayed condition, indicating that in the immediate condition they
use a response mechanism that allows them to signiﬁcantly reduce
their rate of false alarms. This mechanism could be, for example,
a conscious mechanism such as item-speciﬁc recollection or
recall-to-reject, through which healthy controls are able to
minimize their rate of false alarms to unrelated lures, a
mechanism that LBD patients cannot use, due to their episodic
memory deﬁcits.
De Boysson et al. (2011) suggest that patients with frontal lobe
lesions (and AD and LBD patients, frontotemporal dementia
patients, etc.) show both automatic inhibitory and executive
control deﬁcits that keep them, for example, from ignoring
irrelevant information or inhibiting their tendency to respond
“old” to critical lures on the basis of familiarity alone (or gist
memory). Healthy people, on the other hand, can use their item-
speciﬁc recollection capacity to suppress this tendency (based on
familiarity alone) to say “yes”. Supporting this idea, Budson,
Sullivan, Mayer et al. (2002) found that the repetition of the
words on the study task produced a reduction in false recognition
in healthy people (improving their item-speciﬁc recollection
capacity with practice), while AD patients maintain a stable rate
of false memories across repetitions (showing their inability to
improve their item-speciﬁc recollection, due to responding only
on the basis of familiarity or gist memory). In our data, both the
worse performance of the LBD patients on the Stroop test (which
measures the ability to inhibit the irrelevant information) and the
signiﬁcant correlation found between Stroop scores and false
memories rates in the immediate condition (r = 0.39, p < 0.05,
but not in the delayed condition) seem to support this idea,
although we must be cautious in that asseveration due to its
correlational nature and the small sample size. The role that
inhibitory and executive deﬁcits play in both healthy and
pathological aging has been demonstrated through different
experimental methodologies such as retrieval-induced forgetting
(e.g., Gomez-Ariza, Pelegrina, Lechuga, Suarez & Bajo, 2009) or
think/no think (Anderson, Reinholz, Kuhl & Mayr, 2011), and
they deserve a more detailed analysis within the DRM paradigm.
Overall, our results could be best explained by the gist memory
theory (also called fuzzy trace-theory; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995),
which explains true recognition as being due to the sum of
two components: the successful recollection of item-speciﬁc
information (a capacity that is reduced in patients with dementias
like LBD, DCL, AD, etc., compared to healthy subjects) and gist
memory (a capacity that is somewhat impaired, but not annulled,
in patients with dementia compared to healthy patients), while
false recognition would only be explained by gist memory; that
is, false recognition depends on remembering gist, but not item-
speciﬁc information. This theory would explain why our control
group obtains higher rates on both true recognition and false
recognition than the LBD group (due to their greater capacity for
recollection of item-speciﬁc information and better gist memory
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in the former case, and their better gist memory in the latter), or
why in the immediate condition we obtain higher rates on both
true recognition and false recognition than in the delayed
condition (given that in the latter condition, due to the greater
number of items to process on the study list, there is a reduction
in both the capacity for recollection of item-speciﬁc information
and the formation of a clear gist memory), or why true
recognition signiﬁcantly surpasses false recognition only in the
immediate condition in the control group (because only here is
the recollection of item-speciﬁc information effective in reducing
their rates of false alarms). In the same way, our results could be
explained by the activation/monitoring framework (e.g., Roediger,
Watson, McDermott & Gallo, 2001), which also explains both
true recognition and false recognition in terms of two
components: the automatic activation of the studied words that
spreads to the non-studied related lures (affecting false
recognition) and a recollection-based monitoring process of
conscious decision-making, whose result can be correct (affecting
true recognition) or incorrect (affecting false recognition).
Therefore, overall our results would support the theoretical
postulates of the so-called “dual” or “two-processes memory”
models (see e.g., Koen & Yonelinas, 2014; Schoemaker, Gauthier
& Pruessner, 2014; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012, for reviews),
which propose that two processes intervene in recovering (correct
or incorrect) information from our memory, a conscious process
of recovering episodic traces and another automatic process
(called different names by different authors: recollection and
familiarity, item-speciﬁc information and gist memory, explicit
and implicit memory, respectively), an idea that has received
considerable experimental support, even in animal experiments
(e.g., Basile & Hampton, 2013). These two processes seem to rest
on different neuroanatomical bases within the medial temporal
lobe: recollection and episodic memory seem to be mainly related
to hippocampal functioning, while familiarity is associated with
perirhinal and entorhinal cortex functioning (e.g., Yonelinas, Aly,
Wang & Koen, 2010; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012).
In summary, our study shows that LBD patients, after adequate
correction of the basal level of false alarms to non-related lures,
are capable of showing rates (signiﬁcantly different from 0) of
true recognition and false recognition (see also de Boysson et al.,
2011), which would indicate that they are capable, to a certain
degree, of acquiring, retaining and recovering the general
similitude underlying the information (or gist memory; Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995).
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